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						Jamila Verghese 
						  
						  
						 
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              There were inherent contraditions in many of Gandhi's positions. In South Africa he fought for the rights of Indians and Coloureds but never once raised his voice for the Blacks.  
                      
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          Proliferating Terror /  Deception at our doorstep
            Deception: Pakistan, the United States and the Global Nuclear Weapons Conspiracy by Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark. Penguin, 2007. 
            By B G Verghese 
            Sahara Times / New Indian Express/ Book Review, 2007 
            It has been long known, but  for many only in a disjointed, shadowy manner and for few in all its grim  starkness. The truth is stranger than fiction and even more diabolical and  chilling. Deception is a connected  and well documented account, much of it from contemporary records, of an  American-led Western conspiracy with Pakistan  as the principal actor. Its outcome, howsoever unintended some may argue, was  to cultivate and spread nuclear terror through a most dangerously  irresponsible, unscrupulous, dishonest and supremely self-serving policy that  has had a huge collateral fallout of mayhem, human rights violations and  political destabilisation since the late 1970s.   
            The authors, Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, have  painstakingly tracked this saga of American-Pakistan infamy through official  papers, Congressional and other records, interviews, published documents,  boastful memoirs and careless or angry leaks to tell their horror story. Honest  officials, elected representatives, international agencies and friendly  governments were bulldozed, tricked, lied to, subverted or simply bought over  to achieve sordid ends. These were not just unfortunate or even stupid  misjudgements or minor moral lapses but willful acts of powerful men, institutions  and even governments who fostered nuclear proliferation and blackmail,  unmindful of the consequences, in the name of averting just such a disaster.  
            The story starts with Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s determination  after 1971 to make Pakistan  a nuclear power, a resolve reinforced by India’s  Pokhran test in 1974. This coincided with Dr A.Q.Khan’s desire to relocate in Pakistan  from the Netherlands  to help the cause. A rabid anti-Indian nationalist and egotist like Bhutto, AQK  had got a placement in the Netherlands  unit of the top secret tripartite Dutch-German-British URENCO Laboratories that  was dedicated to finding a cheaper and quicker route to uranium enrichment than  the gaseous diffusion process then in vogue through a new centrifuge  technology. Dr Khan was essentially employed as a translator, being doubly  qualified as a nuclear metallurgist while being familiar with the three working  languages required, namely, English, German and Dutch. Security was lax and an  affable Khan, who had a Dutch wife, was able to have photographed or to copy a  whole range of critical papers and designs. He cultivated contacts and  friendships with various equipment manufacturers and suppliers and colleagues  who had set themselves up in business and were willing to supply him with various  components, equipment parts and materials with which to build a centrifuge  plant in Pakistan.  However, suspicious had been aroused and a homesick AQK felt it prudent to  return home to put his new stolen knowledge and contacts to use in the service  of his nation. Bhutto was more than willing and in due course the Dr A.Q. Khan  Laboratories and the Kahuta nuclear facility were running a little outside Islamabad.  The Doctor was in the way to becoming Pakistan’s  favourite son. “Deception” tracks this story.  
            Meanwhile various international developments had projected Pakistan  into a position of considerable vantage. The Pakistan-China honeymoon had  commenced in 1963 and had been cemented by 1971 when Pakistan,  also a staunch American ally, facilitated the US-China rapprochement and  lobbied to secure Taiwan’s  seat in the Security Council for mainland China.  Pokhran-I stimulated Sino-Pakistan nuclear collaboration with Beijing  underpinning Pakistan’s drive to weaponise by supplying enriched fuel and  essential equipment and going to the extent of enabling Pakistan to conduct  cold and, subsequently,  hot tests of a  nuclear device based on one of its own earlier proven test designs. North    Korea chipped in with missile delivery  systems. Pakistan  returned the favour by sharing with them its newly-acquired centrifuge and  other technology and equipment of western design.  
            Burgeoning  activity at Kahuta and Khan’s frenzied efforts to get parts and  
              equipment for it from around the world through shell  companies and devious  
              routes had attracted attention. Fearing time may be short,  AQK launched Project 706, aiming to establish self-sufficiency in manufacturing  nuclear components and acquiring capability through reverse engineering. This  was followed by Project AB  (Atom Bomb) to materialise Bhutto’s dream of an “Islamic Bomb”. This needed  independent funding which was soon realized through sales of nuclear fuel and  parts and components by an increasingly boastful and arrogant Khan to Libya,  Iran and  possibly even to al Qaeda agents. The Americans (and Israeli’s) were by now  sufficiently alarmed to consider bombing Kahuta, an option that India  is also said to have contemplated. They also confronted the Pakistanis and  urged them to desist from proliferation to no avail. The genie was out of the  bottle. 
            What saved Pakistan  was the overthrow of the Shah of Iran. With the US  hostage crisis, or Irangate, Pakistan  was called upon to mediate to get the Americans off the hook. Simultaneously  news came of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.  All was forgiven and Pakistan  was once more a favoured frontline state. It was propped up with aid and,  through a Faustian bargain: the ISI would exclusively route CIA assistance to  the Afghan resistance and Washington  would shut its eyes to Pakistan’s  nuclear activities, with no questions asked. The Americans winked at the  diversion from Afghanistan  of substantial funds and arms by Islamabad  in order to mount a proxy war in J&K and buttress its preferred muhajideen  and   build the Taliban. There was a  virtual non-accounting of its aid to Afghanistan,  part of which went to finance Pakistan’s  nuclear programme which had by now begun to move from self-sufficiency and self  reliance to clandestine nuclear exports and proliferation, even to rogue  elements, as a means of winning friends and influencing people and funding  further stages of its nuclear ambition.    
            AQK, with the full support of the Pakistan  establishment and ISI, was now like a man possessed. He had moved from nuclear  acquisition to nuclear proliferation, having built a nuclear arsenal and  delivery system (the North Korean-modelled Ghauri and F-16s converted to carry  nuclear bombs) and a stockpile of enriched uranium and equipment to trade with  what the Americans called the Axis of Evil. Regime followed regime in both Pakistan  and the US but  AQK seemed to grow larger than life, one step ahead of those out to get him at  home and abroad.  
            The Americans grew worried at various times. Zia died  mysteriously in an air crash and Benazir was brought in, but was a puppet in  the hands of the military. From the late 1970s onwards, whenever AGK’s dirty  tricks were exposed and he or his agents were caught red handed around the  world stealing and smuggling nuclear material, various governments, notably the  US, but the  British, Dutch, German, Canadian and the IAEA as well were prevailed upon to  desist from pursuing the matter and allow the trail to run cold. The Americans  led the pack and orchestrated the obfuscation surrounding AQK’s activities. Men  like Richard Barlow, a CIA expert on Pakistan’s  clandestine nuclear activities and, later, Joseph Wilson, a US  diplomat, were sidetracked and destroyed. Congressional Committees were misled  and stymied. Successive US  President’s lied to Congress to grant Pakistan  annual certification that it was not violating nuclear norms. A completely  bogus case was constructed against Iraq  without credible evidence; but despite clear proof of Pakistan’s  dangerous waywardness, it was let off the hook. 
            Realising that his Dubai  base for orchestrating global undercover transactions and procurement and  distributive sources elsewhere were increasingly exposed, AQK helped set up a  nuclear component manufacturing plant in Malaysia  and then set up offices in the Sudan  and Timbuktu in Mali.  He and his agents travelled incessantly to Pyongyang,  Tripoli, Afghanistan,  Teheran, Khartoum and Timbuktu  freely using Pakistan  military and other official facilities. And all the while, US aid to Pakistan  mounted. Levy and Scott-Clark estimate that maybe up to $ 1 billion of US  aid to Islamabad was funneled into Pakistan’s  nuclear progamme.  
            AQK was his own public relations man. He had an insatiable  hunger for publicity and began to give interviews to the Pakistan  media, boasting of his achievements and promoting a climate of nuclear  ambiguity that enabled Pakistan  to rattle its nuclear armoury without formally admitting to possession of  nuclear weapons. But sometimes he would overstep the mark as he did in an  interview he gave to Kuldip Nayar in 1987.  
            Indo-Pakistan relations further plummeted with the launch of  Pakistan’s  proxy-jihadi war in J&K in 1989. The US was tireless in describing Kashmir  as a global danger and nuclear flashpoint and sent out a mission under Robert  Gates to avert a nuclear exchange unmindful, as earlier and since, that the  source of that danger, whether in Kashmir, Iraq, Iran or North Korea was its  own reckless and flagrant patronage of Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation  that  had even extended to talks with al  Qaeda agents, and plans to help them develop a dirty bomb with which to  blackmail America too.   
            When US  intelligence got into Kabul in  November 2001 along with the victorious Northern Alliance,  it discovered evidence that pointed to Pakistan’s  WMD flirtation with the al Qaeda. A decade earlier, word had leaked of Pakistan’s  plans to offer Saddam Hussein blueprints to set up a uranium enrichment plant  and recycled nuclear bomb designs. IAEA inspectors in Iraq  were later able to collect more direct evidence of this but failed to excite  any American interest in the matter. In the event, Iraq  was bombed to submission; Pakistan  continued to be mollycoddled. In November 2000, the Pakistan Army staged “IDEAS  2000”, an international munitions fair in Karachi,  the centerpiece of which was Khan Research Laboratories’ exhibit with glossy  brochures promoting the sales of centrifuges with after sales consultancy  services that included “installation, repair and maintenance”, all officially  cleared for export. It was brazen. .      
            9/11 alarmed the US  and Musharraf once again became America’s  foremost partner in the War against Terror. Once again, all was forgiven – and  fleeing Talibans were given safe haven in Pakistan!  Then, with the declaration of “Mission Accomplished” in Iraq,  Bush turned the heat on Musharraf. AQK was “retired”. In 2003 the Americans  confronted the Pakistan  President in New York with an  exhibition incontrovertibly exposing AQKs proliferation misdeeds worldwide.  Musharraf records in his autobiography “In the Line of Fire” that he found  himself “at a loss for words”. This was the most embarrassing moment of his  life. But he quickly found his tongue to distance the Pakistan Government and  himself from AQK who was denounced as a braggart and dangerous megalomaniac.  This pretence convinced nobody. The Pakistan Government and Musharraf  personally are closely involved. The one reason AQK, though questioned, has not  been brought to trial is not because he is Pakistan’s greatest national hero  but because he prepared a brief on Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear adventures  and sent it off to London with his younger daughter to publish if he came to  any harm. The blackmail has worked.  
            Since then more information has come from Libya,  which has made a full disclosure of its AQK connection, North    Korea and Iran.  The exposure is complete but the charade goes on. Pakistan  has become a refuge for the al Qaeda with Quetta  as a base.  
            In 2005, a powerful earthquake laid waste areas along the  LOC in PAK. This saw all the so-called banned jihadi outfits resurface as  relief agencies that worked with the military authorities. The earthquake also  destroyed part of the Kahuta nuclear complex, causing something of a “nuclear  accident” that sent alarm bells ringing in Islamabad.  Musharraf called on AQ Khan for help. Khan refused. However, the restoration  has proceeded even as more evidence has surfaced, this time through German  intelligence, that Pakistan  continues to trade in nuclear weapons technology – buying and selling as before  to Iran and Saudi    Arabia. New clients include Syria,  Egypt and  others unnamed and unknown, leading to apprehensions of a widening circle of  proliferation. According to Levy and Scott-Clark the old Pakistan-China-North  Korea nexus has not been ended. It has merely evolved.    
            Despite all its homilies and alarms about controlling  proliferation, the United States  has clearly been part of the problem and it is not as yet certain whether it  has turned over a new leaf. It is afraid to turn the screws on its ally, Pakistan,  as it fears that any consequent regime instability there could result in  nuclear technology and material falling into the hands of rogue elements.  
            Deception has some  minor errors of fact which need to be corrected. But the main thesis of  Pakistani and US  nuclear perfidy and gross irresponsibility is powerfully made and substantiated  in a gripping, interconnected account.   American posturing, even in the debate surrounding the 123 civil nuclear  agreement with India,  combines extraordinary amnesia with extraordinary arrogance in demanding  guarantees of Indian good conduct and a distancing from Iran  while it has played and condoned every trick in the book to imperil the world  and, certainly, India.
             
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